The plaintiff was a member of a golf club of which the two defendants were the proprietors and the female defendant also the secretary. One of the rules of the club provided that “no notice or placard shall be posted in the club premises without the consent of the secretary.” Certain automatic gambling machines had been kept by the defendants on the club premises for the use of the members of the club. Some one gave information to the police, with the result that the machines were removed from the club premises. On the following day some one put up on the wall of the club a typewritten paper containing the following verse:-

The word “byrnn” was blacked out in the original and the word “burn” substituted for it. The plaintiff brought a libel action against the two defendants alleging that they had published the words in the notice of and concerning him to the members of the club. He alleged that the words meant that he had reported to the police the existence of the machines upon the club premises and that he had been guilty of underhand disloyalty to the members of the club.

Held: (1) not libellous because a law-abiding member of society would think Mr Byrne had acted properly; (2) there was sufficient evidence of publication because the defendants had not removed the note despite being aware of it.

H. & Sons were in the habit of receiving, in payment from their customers, cheques on various branches of a bank, which the bank cashed for the convenience of H. & Sons at a particular branch. Having had a squabble with the manager of that branch H. & Sons sent a printed circular to a large number of their customers (who knew nothing of the squabble)—“H. & Sons hereby give notice that they will not receive in payment cheques drawn on any of the branches of the” bank. The circular became known to other persons; there was a run on the bank and loss inflicted. The bank having brought an action against H. & Sons for libel, with an innuendo that the circular imputed insolvency.

Held: the natural meaning of the words was not libellous.

Mr Artemus Jones, a barrister in practice, had been at one time on the staff of the Sunday Chronicle , a newspaper owned and published by the appellants, and contributed articles signed by himself to some of the appellants’ publications. The appellants published in the Sunday Chronicle an article a part of which ran thus;

“Upon the terrace marches the world, attracted by the motor races—a world immensely pleased with itself, and minded to draw a wealth of inspiration—and, incidentally, of golden cocktails—from any scheme to speed the passing hour. … ‘Whist! there is Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know—the other thing!’ whispers a fair neighbour of mine excitedly into her bosom friend’s ear. Really, is it not surprising how certain of our fellow-countrymen behave when they come abroad? Who would suppose, by his goings on, that he was a churchwarden at Peckham? No one, indeed, would assume that Jones in the atmosphere of London would take on so austere a job as the duties of a churchwarden. Here, in the atmosphere of Dieppe, on the French side of the Channel, he is the life and soul of a gay little band that haunts the Casino and turns night into day, besides betraying a most unholy delight in the society of female butterflies.”

Artemus Jones complained and the newspaper printed the following apology:

“It seems hardly necessary for us to state that the imaginary Mr. Artemus Jones referred to in our article was not Mr. Thomas Artemus Jones, barrister, but, as he has complained to us, we gladly publish this paragraph in order to remove any possible misunderstanding and to satisfy Mr. Thomas Artemus Jones we had no intention whatsoever of referring to him.”

Note that: “apart from the name used, none of the details with regard to the imaginary personage described in the libel were applicable to the plaintiff, inasmuch as he is not a married man, nor a churchwarden, nor a resident of Peckham; nor was he either a frequenter of Dieppe or there at the time when the scene described in the alleged libel took place.”

Held: for the plaintiff.

Chase v News Group Newspapers

On the front page of the newspaper for June 22 there was a large headline “Nurse is probed over 18 deaths: World Exclusive”. The article said that she was suspected of overdosing terminally ill “youngsters” with painkillers. It identified the children concerned as nine boys and nine girls, aged between eight weeks and 17 years.

Held: The words were incapable of meaning merely “reasonable grounds to investigate”. In order to justify a publication to the effect that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant was guilty of an offence, a defendant had to establish that there were objectively reasonable grounds for such suspicion. The defendant could not establish this and would therefore fail.